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 The Effect of Product Regulation
 on Business Global Competitiveness:
 A Contingency Approach 1
 Abstract
 ■ This paper focuses on product regulation, which is one important type of
 regulation that influences business firms. We develop a theoretical model that
 describes the effect of product regulation on the global competitiveness of
 business.
 ■ Special emphasis is given to the contingency effects of several variables on the
 relationship between product regulation and business global competitiveness.
 We derive three propositions about these contingency effects, and also discuss
 higher-order interactions that may occur between the contingency variables.
 Key Results
 ■ The overall thrust of our argument is to question the universality of the
 assumption that regulation is detrimental to business competitiveness.
 Authors
 Carol M. Sanchez, Assistant Professor, Management Department, F.E. Seidman School of Busi-
 ness, Grand Valley State University, Allendale, MI, U.S.A.
 William McKinley, Associate Professor, Department of Management, Southern Illinois University
 at Carbondale, Carbondale, IL, U.S.A.
 Manuscript received March 1994, revised August 1994, revised January 1995.
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 The Effect of Product Regulation on
 Business Global Competitiveness: A Contingency Approach
 As we move rapidly toward the close of the twentieth century, business firms are
 becoming increasingly constrained by government regulations. For example,
 electric utilities in the United States must comply with the new emission guide-
 lines of the federal Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (Enholm and Malko
 1994). In Germany, stringent solid waste recycling laws make manufacturers
 responsible for disposal of their products' packaging even after use by con-
 sumers (Sharfman and Ellington 1993). Most recently, U.S. Congressional hear-
 ings have highlighted initiatives by the Food and Drug Administration to
 regulate tobacco as a drug.
 Among the wide range of government regulations affecting business firms,
 one important type is product regulation. In this paper, product regulation is
 defined as the establishment of standards through formal legislation designed to
 protect consumers' health and safety in their physical contact with consumer
 products (MacAvoy 1992, OECD 1980, Viscusi 1984). Product safety standards
 constitute a legal specification of the consumer's right to expect that consumer
 goods placed on the market are safe under conditions of normal use, or reason-
 ably foreseeable misuse (OECD 1987). Examples of product regulation include
 the statutes administered by the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission,
 which include the Consumer Product Safety Act, the Federal Hazardous Sub-
 stances Act, the Flammable Fabrics Act, the Poison Prevention Packaging Act,
 the Refrigerator Safety Act, and the Fire Safe Cigarette Act. One goal of
 product regulation is to protect the public against unreasonable risks of injury
 associated with consumer products. This is quite different from the goals of
 antitrust regulation, which focuses on market structure and firm conduct within
 markets, and regulates phenomena such as entry, exit, merger, and prices (Caves
 1982, Wholey and Sanchez 1991).
 A common argument among economists and business executives is that
 regulations are detrimental to the competitiveness of a business, because of the
 costs involved in complying with them (Caves 1982, Guttmann, Sierck, and
 Friedland 1992, Kling 1988, Scherer and Ross 1990, Schultze 1977). This paper
 challenges the universality of that assumption. We develop a contingency theory
 of the effect of domestic product regulation on the global competitiveness of
 individual businesses. We first review prior literature regarding the effects of
 product regulation on business performance, and then provide an operational-
 izable definition of business global competitiveness (BGC). Next, we identify
 three contingency variables that condition the effect of domestic product regu-
 lation on business global competitiveness. These three contingency variables
 are: 1) the degree to which a business uses a differentiation strategy (Porter 1980,
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 1985); 2) whether global industry demand is declining or growing; and 3)
 whether the business' managers perceive regulation as a threat or an opportuni-
 ty. Theoretical arguments and propositions are developed that describe the
 conditioning effects of each of these variables on the domestic product regula-
 tion-BGC relationship. In addition, higher-order interactions between the three
 contingency variables are discussed, and the influence of these interactions on
 the linkage between domestic product regulation and business global competi-
 tiveness is analysed.
 This paper makes two contributions to our knowledge of the dynamics
 linking regulation and business performance. First, the paper focuses on one of
 the most important types of regulation (product regulation) and one of the most
 critical dimensions of business performance (global competitiveness). Given the
 increasing pace of globalization and the rapid growth of product regulation in
 many countries (Levitt 1983, OECD 1980, 1987, Post and Mahon 1980, Ung-
 son, James, and Spicer 1985, Vernon-Wortzel and Wortzel 1991), it is essential
 that businesses learn how to compete effectively in regulated, world-wide mar-
 kets. The theoretical framework developed in this paper, and the empirical
 research that will hopefully follow, may provide some guidelines for achieving
 that objective.
 Second, this paper analyses product regulation from a strategic choice per-
 spective (Child 1972, Miles and Snow 1978), as a factor that provides managers
 with choices. By presenting managers with choices, product regulation has
 strategic implications for the ability of a business to expand competitive advan-
 tage in global markets. The view of regulation as a stimulus for choice is
 consistent with past work that has emphasized diversity in the responses of
 individual organizations to the same regulatory requirement (e.g., Marcus and
 Goodman 1986).
 Product Regulation and Business Global Competitiveness
 There is a growing body of literature that attempts to determine the relationship
 between product regulation and business performance (Leonard 1984, Marcus
 and Goodman 1986, MacAvoy 1992, Temin 1979, Thomas 1990, Ungson,
 James, and Spicer 1985). Some studies suggest a positive relationship between
 product regulation and business performance (Leonard 1984, Thomas 1990,
 Wood 1984). But other studies imply a negative relationship (Viscusi 1984,
 OECD 1980, Zashin 1982). These inconsistent results are due to problems in
 defining and measuring product regulation and business performance, and the
 fact that most models pose a simple relationship between product regulation
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 and business performance, rather than one that takes account of the contingen-
 cy effects of contextual variables (Gordon and Miller 1976, Marcus and Good-
 man 1986).
 One important aspect of business performance that is potentially influenced
 by product regulation is business global competitiveness. We expect product
 regulation to affect business global competitiveness because of the pervasive
 influence product regulation has on the cost structure and attributes of products
 sold in global markets. In recent years, a considerable literature has developed
 on global competition and global strategy (e.g., Bartlett and Ghoshal 1991,
 Franko 1989, Ghoshal 1987, Hamel and Prahalad 1985, Kogut 1989, Levitt
 1983, Porter 1986, 1990). However, this literature rarely provides a definition of
 global competitiveness at the level of the individual business or strategic busi-
 ness unit (SBU). For the purposes of this paper, we define business global
 competitiveness as the ability of a business to establish a sustainable competitive
 advantage in a global product or service market (Franko 1989, McKinley,
 Munroe, Larson, Melcher, and Chaudhuri 1991). Business global competitive-
 ness is an operationalizable construct, and is therefore falsifiable in the sense
 described by Bacharach (1989). As Bacharach (1989) stressed, construct falsifi-
 ability is important for stating propositions that can be discontinued, and
 therefore for the ability to make conclusive judgements about the validity of
 theory. Operational indicators of business global competitiveness include
 growth in a business' global sales or share of a global market (Franko 1989,
 McKinley et al. 1991).
 Differentiation Strategy
 Some of the literature reviewed above suggests that product regulation in a
 business' home country will be detrimental to the business' global competitive-
 ness, because conforming to product regulations increases costs (Caves 1982,
 Kling 1988, Scherer and Ross 1990, Schultze 1977). A central argument of this
 paper is that this effect is conditioned by the degree to which a firm uses a
 differentiation strategy. Porter (1980, 1985) has described differentiation as one
 of several generic strategies that businesses use to gain a sustainable competitive
 advantage in product or service markets. The competitive advantage provided
 by a differentiation strategy stems from the development of unique, value-en-
 hancing product or service attributes other than low price (Huo and McKinley
 1992, Porter 1985).
 We argue that the more a business uses a differentiation strategy, the more
 positive the effect of domestic product regulation on the business' global com-
 petitiveness. There are two reasons for this. First, as Porter (1990) and Leonard
 (1984) have pointed out, the regulation of product safety and performance
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 standards encourages upgrading of product quality and creation of new product
 features. Businesses following a differentiation strategy will be able to incorpo-
 rate these features into their overall strategic posture, and use them to build a
 unique image for their product. In other words, a differentiation strategy pro-
 vides the conceptual framework within which product or process improvements
 mandated by product regulation can be translated into increases in global
 market share.
 Second, the use of a differentiation strategy enhances the ability of a firm to
 absorb the short-term costs associated with regulatory compliance. If a differen-
 tiation strategy is implemented successfully, enough value is added to a firm's
 products to justify a higher price than that demanded by competitors (Porter
 1985). Under these conditions, compliance costs due to product regulation will
 have a less noticeable effect on market share, and that effect is likely to be
 outweighed by the share increases attributable to improved product features.
 Examples from Japan and Germany illustrate how product regulation and
 a differentiation strategy combine to enhance the global competitive advantage
 of businesses. Japan adopted stringent product quality standards for export
 goods in the 1950's and 1960's (Porter 1990), and those standards helped Japa-
 nese firms pursue successful differentiation strategies in many global industries.
 In Germany, the Reinheitsgebot - a 1516 law regulating the purity of beer - is
 one of the oldest examples of product regulation known to man. This law is still
 used today by German brewers as a basis for differentiating their products from
 those of global competitors. The regulatory standards established by the Ger-
 man Institute for Standardization (Porter 1990) have had a similar effect for
 many other German businesses pursuing global differentiation strategies. In
 many cases (for instance, automobiles), the perceived value and high quality of
 the products offered by Japanese or German firms (Hitt, Hoskisson, and Har-
 rison 1991, Porter 1986, 1990, Wortzel 1989) have justified premium prices,
 which have allowed the businesses to recover the costs involved in adhering to
 home-country product standards (Porter 1990). In some cases, product features
 mandated by product regulation may be incorporated into the differentiation
 strategy to increase value and market share. An example would be BMW's
 two-seat Zl Roadster, which has plastic external body panels that are labeled
 according to resin type, and designed for easy disassembly and collection for
 recycling (U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment 1992).
 This argument suggests the following propostion:
 Proposition 1: The greater the use of a differentiation strategy, the more positive
 the effect of domestic product regulation on business global com-
 petitiveness.
 Note that in the interaction predicted by Proposition 1, the product regulation-
 BGC relationship can range from negative when a differentiation strategy is not
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 used, to positive when a differentiation strategy is the dominant method for
 attaining competitive advantage. Note also that the proposition is consistent
 with the results of Temin's (1979) study of the influence of food and drug
 regulations on the pharmaceutical industry. Food and Drug Administration
 regulations resulted in shared patents and competing patents on similar drugs.
 Firms that were successful in gaining larger market shares for these drugs were
 those that increased their advertising, which is a major indicator of product
 differentiation (Temin 1979).
 Global Industry Demand
 Another variable that may affect the relationship between domestic product
 regulation and a business' global competitiveness is the nature of demand
 (declining or growing) in the global industry. Harrigan (1980) and Parker and
 Helms (1992) have analysed the characteristics of declining industries, and the
 different strategies businesses can use to compete in such industries. In general,
 declining demand (or movement of the demand curve to the left) in an industry
 puts downward pressure on prices (Caves 1982, Samuelson 1976, Stigler 1976).
 This reduces a business' ability to recoup the extra costs involved in conforming
 to domestic product regulation. If the business raises prices to recover costs
 generated by regulation of attributes like product safety, it is likely to lose
 market share in an environment of declining demand. In fact, Harrigan (1980)
 identified declining industries with substantial reinvestment requirements as
 unfavorable competitive environments. A business might be able to differentiate
 its product based on features mandated by product regulation, but declining
 global demand will put limits on the number of customers who will be willing
 to pay the price of such differentiation. This suggests that domestic product
 regulation will have a negative influence on a business' global competitiveness
 in industries where demand is falling.
 On the other hand, in industries where global demand is growing, the
 competitive situation is quite different. Growth in demand (or movement of the
 demand curve to the right) exerts upward pressure on prices (Caves 1982,
 Samuelson 1976, Stigler 1976), and therefore increases the margins available to
 businesses to absorb the costs of product regulation. If the product has value to
 a growing customer base, the additional costs imposed by regulatory require-
 ments will be viewed as less significant than if demand is declining. Also, in an
 environment of growing global demand, businesses can more easily use product
 or process upgrades mandated by product regulation as the basis for differenti-
 ation strategies. If those strategies are successful, they should have a positive
 effect on the business' market share and global competitiveness.
 This discussion suggests the following proposition:
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 Proposition 2: As global industry demand varies from low growth to high growth,
 the effect of domestic product regulation on a business' global
 competitiveness becomes more positive.
 One example that illustrates the interaction of product regulation and growing
 global demand is the poly vinyl chloride (PVC) resin industry (Leonard 1984).
 U.S. firms in the global PVC industry have remained highly competitive despite
 - or perhaps because of - intense product regulation at home. The case of
 acrylonitrile, a high-volume intermediate organic chemical which provides raw
 material for industry, is similar to the PVC case. In both instances, a growing
 demand for the product, as well as the availability of the right production
 technology when it was needed, helped producers absorb the added costs of
 regulatory compliance, and retain market share (Leonard, 1984).
 Product Regulation: Threat or Opportunity?
 As Whetten (1981) has noted, the Chinese word for crisis is composed of two
 symbols: danger and opportunity. This suggests a duality in many environmen-
 tal events that impinge on organizations: on the one hand, they may be con-
 strued as dangers or threats, and on the other hand they may be construed as
 opportunities. We believe that product regulation is representative of this
 duality, because a business' managers can interpret product regulation as either
 a threat or an opportunity. Depending on which interpretation is dominant, the
 effect of product regulation on the global competitiveness of the business will
 vary.
 A considerable literature has accumulated regarding the effects of threat and
 threat-inducing events on organizations and their members (Bozeman and
 Slusher 1979, Cameron 1983, D'Aunno and Sutton 1992, Dunbar and Wasi-
 lewski 1985, Jackson and Dutton 1988, Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton 1981).
 The conclusion of much of this literature is that threat produces constricted
 domain definition, restricted information processing, and rigidity among indi-
 viduals in organizations (Bozeman and Slusher 1979, Smart and Vertinsky 1977,
 Staw et al. 1981). Thus, if product regulation is interpreted as a threat, managers
 may be inhibited by these psychological forces from perceiving innovative re-
 sponses to regulatory standards. Under conditions of threat, the response to
 product regulation is likely to be resistance (Birnbaum 1985), and Marcus and
 Goodman (1986) have suggested that resistance to regulation has negative
 consequences. For example, an attitude of resistance is unlikely to encourage
 strategic initiatives that could be used to expand global market share. In sum-
 mary, domestic product regulation is likely to have a negative effect on a
 business' global competitiveness if the regulatory mandate is construed as a
 threat.
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 By contrast, if product regulation is interpreted as an opportunity, we
 anticipate a very different dynamic. Viewing a new product standard as an
 opportunity sensitizes managers to ways that the standard can be incorporated
 into product design or marketing strategies. The result will be unique product
 characteristics or marketing campaigns that can be used to capture expanded
 positions in global markets. Seeing product regulation as an opportunity can
 also help managers anticipate new regulatory standards even before they are
 enacted into law. Such anticipation can have positive benefits (Marcus and
 Goodman 1986). These include the possibility of developing new, standard-
 driven technologies and riding the experience curve downward before competi-
 tors do. The cost advantages gained by such anticipatory technological develop-
 ment will contribute to a business' global competitiveness. For example, those
 American automobile companies that are developing safety features in anticipa-
 tion of new regulatory standards are likely to be competitive in the global auto
 market of the future.
 This argument supports a third proposition:
 Proposition 3: The less product regulation is perceived as a threat, and the more
 it is perceived as an opportunity, the less adverse the effect of
 domestic product regulation on business global competitiveness.
 This proposition may help explain the results of some previous studies of
 regulation. In a study of forest product firms, Sonnenfeld (1982) found a posi-
 tive relationship between attitudes of tolerance toward regulators and other
 stakeholders, on the one hand, and firm effectiveness, on the other. Ungson,
 James, and Spicer (1985) found that managers of wood products firms who
 perceived their regulators as adversaries also believed that the added costs and
 lowered morale attributable to inefficient regulatory enforcement were detri-
 mental to business performance. The proposition above underscores how im-
 portant perceptions of regulation are to the performance of businesses, especial-
 ly their global performance.
 Global Competitiveness Profiles
 The preceding section suggests that a number of factors influence a business'
 ability to respond effectively to product regulation, and translate those responses
 into global competitive advantage. In the propositions above, we have separated
 out the effects of each of the variables that condition the relationship between
 domestic product regulation and business global competitiveness. This was
 done in order to facilitate future empirical testing of the propositions. However,
 300 mlr vol. 35, 1995/4
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 Table 1. Higher-Order Interaction Effects of Firm and Industrial-Level Variables on the Relation-
 ship Between Product Regulation and Business Global Competitiveness
 Regulation perceived as threat Regulation perceived as opportunity
 High Low High Low
 differentiation differentiation differentiation differentiation
 Declining Adverse effects Mutually Potentially Adverse effects
 demand on business reinforcing offsetting effects on BGC
 global competi- adverse effects on BGC
 tiveness (BGC) on BGC
 Growing Potentially Adverse effects Mutually Potentially
 demand offsetting effects on BGC reinforcing offsetting effects
 on BGC positive effects on BGC
 on BGC
 in the real world, the contingency variables are likely to influence one another,
 and combine to create higher-order interaction effects, as portrayed in Table 1 .
 For example, growing industry demand helps foster a belief that product regu-
 lation can be translated into an opportunity. Furthermore, demand growth
 supplies the revenues needed to capitalize on the opportunity, and a differenti-
 ation strategy provides a cognitive framework that helps transform regulation-
 driven product modifications into competitive market position. A differentia-
 tion strategy also makes it less likely that product regulation will be perceived
 as a paralysing threat, further enhancing the probability of a globally compet-
 itive response to regulation. The profile being described is illustrated in the
 lower right-hand, highlighted cell of Table 1 . This profile is similar in complexity
 to the "configurations" or "gestalts" discussed by Gordon and Miller (1976,
 Miller 1987, Miller and Friesen 1984). Such configurations have received in-
 creased attention from organizational researchers recently (e.g., Meyer, Tsui,
 and Hinings 1993, Baker and Cullen 1993).
 The businesses least likely to translate domestic product regulation into a
 global competitive advantage will be those that do not use a differentiation
 strategy, and have a top management team that views product regulation as a
 threat. In addition, the effects of these variables, which are themselves mutually
 reinforcing, will be compounded if the business is operating in an industry where
 demand is declining. Decline encourages the use of efficiency criteria (Bozeman
 and Slusher 1979, Cameron 1983), and those criteria are inconsistent with the
 implementation of a differentiation strategy. Furthermore, declining demand
 constitutes a threat to a business, and threat perpetuates the emphasis on
 efficiency (Staw etal. 1981). The threat brought about by decline will also
 encourage the kinds of rigidities described by Staw etal. (1981), and those
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 rigidities will reduce the chances of a globally competitive response to domestic
 product regulation. The profile we are outlining in this paragraph is shown in
 the upper left-hand, highlighted cell of Table 1 . It is characterized by a complex
 array of triple interactions and mutually reinforcing feedback effects that help
 make the influence of domestic product regulation on business global competi-
 tiveness negative.
 Discussion and Conclusion
 The ideas presented in this paper suggest that government regulation may be
 compatible with the economic performance of individual businesses, at least
 under certain conditions. This perspective can be contrasted with the views of
 some economists and business executives (Caves 1982, Kling 1988, Scherer and
 Ross 1990, Schultze 1977) who assume that there is a trade-off between societal
 demands for correcting market externalities and effective business performance.
 Our paper raises the possibility that if product regulation is perceived as an
 opportunity rather than a threat, and if growing market demand and a differen-
 tiation strategy provide financial and cognitive resources with which to capitalize
 on the opportunity, domestic product regulation can improve the global com-
 petitiveness of a business. On the other hand, if these facilitative conditions are
 not present, domestic product regulation is more likely to inhibit the global
 competitiveness of individual businesses. Future research might explore whether
 this contingency framework applies to the relationship between other types of
 regulation and business performance.
 This brings up a second point, which has to do with the issue of managerial
 choice mentioned in the introduction. If our arguments are correct, the global
 competitiveness of businesses in markets where product characteristics are
 regulated is not completely determined by immutable external forces, as is
 argued by some economists (see Scherer and Ross 1990). To some extent, global
 competitiveness is a function of the choices managers make in responding to the
 societal expectations represented by product regulation. Managers may not be
 able to exert control over trends in market demand, but the competitive strategy
 they follow and the way they view product regulation are at least partly control-
 lable. This suggests an important role for the strategic management of product
 regulation, as well as the possibility that such management may generate a
 significant payoff in improved global competitiveness. Further work on this
 topic would enhance our understanding of effective organizational responses to
 product regulation, and government regulation more generally.
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 Notes
 1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the International Association for Business and
 Society conference, Hilton Head, South Carolina, March, 1994. The authors would like to thank
 Joe Cheng, Lars Larson, Jianwen Liao, Arlyn Melcher, Gyewan Moon, Chuck Stubbart, and
 two anonymous MIR reviewers for their helpful comments on previous drafts of the paper. Both
 authors contributed equally to the paper.
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